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Group biases guide social interactions by promoting in-group favouritism, but the neural 
mechanisms underpinning group biases remain unclear. While neuroscience research has 
shown that distributed brain circuits are associated with seeing in-group and out-group 
members as “us” and “them”, it is less clear how these networks exchange signals. This fMRI 
study uses functional connectivity analyses to investigate the contribution of functional 
integration to group bias modulation of person perception. Participants were assigned to an 
arbitrary group and during scanning they observed bodies of in-group or out-group members 
that cued the recall of positive or negative social knowledge. The results showed that 
functional coupling between perceptual and cognitive neural networks is tuned to particular 
combinations of group membership and social knowledge valence. Specifically, coupling 
between body perception and theory-of-mind networks is biased towards seeing a person that 
had previously been paired with information consistent with group bias (positive for in-group 
and negative for out-group). This demonstrates how brain regions associated with visual 
analysis of others and belief reasoning exchange and integrate signals when evaluating in-
group and out-group members. The results update models of person perception by showing 
how and when interplay occurs between perceptual and extended systems when developing a 




Group biases are prevalent in daily social interactions and typically involve in-group 
favouritism and out-group dislike (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999). To date, neuroscience 
research has identified a set of brain circuits that control social interactions based on group 
membership, which span perceptual, affective and cognitive processes (Molenberghs, 2013; 
Amodio, 2014). However, it is currently unclear how signals from segregated patches of 
cortex are integrated during the perception of in-group and out-group members. The current 
fMRI experiment investigates the contribution of functional integration to group bias 
modulation of person perception. 
Among the features used to categorize individuals as members of an in-group or out-
group, race is commonly studied (Ito and Bartholow, 2009; Kubota et al., 2012; Azevedo et 
al., 2013; Molenberghs, 2013). For example, it has been demonstrated that the ability to 
recognise members of another race is impaired compared to own-race recognition (Malpass 
and Kravitz, 1969). Besides such pre-existing social categories, group biases can also be 
elicited by assigning individuals to a group based on arbitrary rules, such as the toss of a coin; 
a procedure known as minimal group assignment (Tajfel et al., 1971). Such an arbitrary 
categorisation also leads to better recognition of in-group members (Bernstein et al., 2007), as 
well as more favourable judgments of in-group compared to out-group members (Tajfel et al., 
1971; Otten and Moskowitz, 2000; Hertel and Kerr, 2001). As such, even a temporary group 
assignment based on arbitrary criteria biases the way others are perceived and judged. In 
short, group membership has a powerful influence on the mental operations that underpin and 
guide social interactions. 
Over the last 15 years, neuroscience research has started to investigate the neural 
correlates of group-bias. Consistent with the majority of human cognitive neuroscience 
research (Fox and Friston, 2012), investigations into the neural correlates of group bias have 
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primarily focussed on measuring the response of functionally segregated brain circuits. These 
studies have shown that several brain circuits that span perceptual, affective, and cognitive 
systems are sensitive to group membership (Figure 1; Molenberghs 2013; Amodio 2014). For 
example, patches of cortex along the ventral visual stream, which are involved in person 
perception (Kanwisher, 2010), show a response bias for in-group compared to out-group 
members based on racial and minimal group assignment (Golby et al., 2001; Van Bavel et al., 
2008, 2011; Azevedo et al., 2013). Reduced activity for out-group compared to in-group 
members has been associated with diminished motivation to individuate out-group members 
(Malpass and Kravitz, 1969; Golby et al., 2001). 
When categorising others we also “feel” differently about in-group compared to out-
group members (Harris and Fiske, 2007; Mackie et al., 2008; Azevedo et al., 2013). An 
“affective network” of brain regions comprising amygdala, insula, striatum, and anterior 
frontal cortex, has been found to be underpin the ability to feel what someone else might feel 
(Keysers and Gazzola, 2009). This affective network also shows sensititivy to group biases 
(Golby et al., 2001; Wheeler and Fiske, 2005; Eres and Molenberghs, 2013; Molenberghs, 
2013; Amodio, 2014; Azevedo et al., 2014; Molenberghs et al., 2016). For instance, left OFC 
was more active when participants saw an out-group member inflict harm to an in-group 
member compared to an out-group member (Molenberghs et al., 2016). Moreover, this area 
was functionally coupled with left insula and amygdala under these conditions, revealing a 
bias in the affective network to preferentially process in-group suffering. 
A third neural network to show sensitivity to group membership is the Theory-of-
Mind (ToM) network (Harris and Fiske 2007; Volz et al. 2009; Contreras et al. 2012; Eres 
and Molenberghs 2013; Molenberghs and Morrison 2014). The ToM-network is engaged 
when making self-other distinctions, when reasoning about others’ mental states (cognitive 
empathy), as well as when inferring traits about others (van Overwalle, 2009). The ToM-
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network includes mPFC, temporal poles, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus (Frith 
and Frith 1999; Mitchell, 2009; Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; van Overwalle 2009). When 
categorising individuals as in-group members, several ToM nodes are also involved (Volz et 
al., 2009; Molenberghs and Morrison, 2014). For example, when dividing money between in- 
and out-group members, participants gave more money to their in-group members and this 
decision was accompanied by greater activation of mPFC and left TPJ (Volz et al., 2009). 
Volz and colleagues (2009) suggest that ToM-network engagement reflects the different 
demands placed on self-other judgments when evaluating in-group compared to out-group 
members. 
In sum, prior neuroimaging studies have shown how segregated patches of cortex are 
associated with seeing “us” and “them” during social interactions (Molenberghs, 2013). A 
key question from a neuroscience perspective, however, is how distributed neural circuits 
interact to support mental processes (Sporns et al., 2005; Sporns, 2014). Indeed, mental 
processes are likely to be an emergent property of network integration, rather that the sole 
work on segregated groups of neurons acting alone (Yuste, 2015). Network models of brain 
function that comprise interacting components have been proposed and supported in 
theoretical and systems biology (Bassett and Gazzaniga, 2011), but few empirical studies 
have directly tested how segregated circuits exchange information. For instance, with regard 
to group bias, it is currently unclear to what extent and in what ways neural circuits interact as 
a function of group membership. The current fMRI study uses functional connectivity 
analyses to investigate group bias modulation of person perception. 
The design of the study was based on evidence that in-group members are viewed 
more positively than out-group members (Allport, 1954; Mullen et al., 1992; Brewer, 1999), 
as well as on research revealing that information consistent with stereotypes is remembered 
better than bias-inconsistent information (Fyock and Stangor, 1994). We hypothesised 
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increased functional coupling between perceptual (Fusiform and Extrastriate Body Areas, 
FBA and EBA), affective, and cognitive (ToM) neural networks when seeing a person that 
had previously been paired with information consistent with their biases (positive for in-group 
and negative for out-group). Prior neuroimaging work has shown that body and ToM 
networks show increased coupling when forming links between body cues and social 
knowledge (Greven et al., 2016), as well as recalling social knowledge based on body cues 
(Greven & Ramsey, 2017). As such, the current study would extend prior work by 
understanding how neural network integration supports group bias modulation of person 
perception. Although more group bias research in person perception has focussed on faces, 
bodies convey a multitude of relevant social signals and offer cues that faces might hide 
(Slaughter et al., 2004; Aviezer et al., 2012), which makes bodies interesting to study in their 
own right. More generally, as integration between discrete brain circuits is a growing 
consideration for understanding brain function (Friston and Price, 2001; Sporns et al., 2005; 
Sporns, 2013) understanding how perceptual, cognitive and affective networks interact is a 
model problem that speaks to a fundamental question in human neuroscience. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-four participants (15 females; mean ± SD age: 22.6 ± 4.7 years) were 
recruited from the Bangor community and received a monetary reimbursement of £15 for 
completing the fMRI experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and reported no history of neurological damage and gave informed consent according to the 
local ethics guidelines. A behavioural pilot experiment was completed to validate the task and 
involved 31 participants (24 females; mean ± SD age: 20.8 ± 6 years). No participants 
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completed both pilot and fMRI experiments. For 3 participants, 2 sessions from the main task 
had to be removed due to excessive head motion (displacement above 3 mm). 
 
Overview of the experiment 
The full experimental design comprised a 3 (Social knowledge: Positive, Negative, 
Neutral) x 2 (Group bias: in-group, out-group) factorial design. In order to study group bias 
modulation of person perception, the current study only analysed Positive and Negative social 
knowledge conditions. All analyses in the current experiment, therefore, focus on a 2 (Social 
knowledge: Positive, Negative) x 2 (Group bias: in-group, out-group) factorial design. 
Analyses investigating the recall of social knowledge compared to neutral knowledge have 
been reported elsewhere (Greven and Ramsey, 2017). 
The experimental paradigm consisted of several phases (Figure 2): 1) Group 
assignment to the yellow or blue team; 2) Encoding phase, where participants formed an 
impression of a person based on presentation of a body and a statement; 3) fMRI experiment, 
where participants observed all the bodies from the encoding phase and were asked to recall 
knowledge about each person; 4) Recognition phase, where participants had to judge which of 
the two bodies presented in each trial was previously paired with a statement that was 
presented. Further details of each phase of the experiment are provided below. Before the 
scanning experiment, a pilot behavioural experiment was completed to validate the stimuli 




Pictures of 128 bodies were adapted from Greven et al. (2016) that had been selected to 
convey an emotionally-neutral posture (i.e., crossed-arms or slouching postures were not 
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included) but varied in terms of body shape, skin colour and clothing. 16 extra pictures (8 
female) were added to the 128 pictures from Greven and colleagues (2016) for a total of 144 
bodies (72 female). The racial make-up of the bodies was balanced for blue and yellow 
groups. Consistent with prior work (Downing et al., 2007), in order to target regions selective 
for images of bodies and not faces, images had been cropped so the head was not visible. The 
bodies were edited using GIMP 2.8 software (www.gimp.org) to give them a blue and a 
yellow shirt (each body could be part of either team). Participants would never see the same 
body in both a yellow and a blue shirt. Instead, half the participants would see bodies 1 – 72 
in blue and 73 – 144 in yellow, and the other participants would see the opposite combination. 
Each body was only shown once during the encoding experiment, to avoid any possible 
effects of combining the same person with different social knowledge statements over the 
course of the experiment. 
Social knowledge stimuli comprised 144 statements that were adapted from Mitchell 
et al. (2006) to convey either trait-based (positive and negative) or neutral information. An 
example of a trait-implying statement is “He cut in front of the man in line”, implying the 
person is inconsiderate, whereas a neutral example is “She walked through the swivel doors”. 




Group assignment: Each participant was assigned to one of two teams upon arrival. 
They believed this happened randomly as they picked one of two coins (blue or yellow) out of 
a bag. In fact, it was ensured that there were an equal number of females and males in each 
team. For this purpose, coins were occasionally both of the same colour, unbeknownst to the 
participant. After being assigned to a team, participants wore a blue or yellow t-shirt 
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depending on their group assignment and completed a group association task in order to 
enforce their association with their team members. In the group association task, participants 
were presented with every single body they would later see in the fMRI experiment. They had 
to answer as fast and accurately as possible to which team this person belonged by pressing 
‘F’ for their team and ‘J’ for the other team. 
Encoding phase: In the encoding task participants were told that they would see lots 
of different bodies about whom they would learn something, and later on they would be asked 
a number of questions about the bodies. In each trial, participants were presented concurrently 
with a body (wearing a blue or yellow shirt) and a social knowledge statement which could be 
positive, negative, or neutral. For each participant, bodies were randomly assigned to the 
statements. Thus, there was no systematic relationship between particular bodies and 
statements across participants, which removes any coupling between low-level stimulus 
artefacts and any one condition in our design. 
The body (full-colour picture, 300 x 750 pixels) was presented in the middle of the 
screen with text underneath (fontsize 30 pt, 250 pixels below the centre of the screen). Each 
trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by the simultaneous 
presentation of an agent and a statement for 5000 ms. Participants were instructed to pay 
attention to both the person as well as to the knowledge that they would receive about that 
person. 
There were 144 trials in the encoding phase (24 per condition; Positive, Negative, and 
Neutral for Blue and Yellow teams). Trials were presented in 8 blocks containing a random 
sequence of 18 trials from 3 valence conditions. Blocks alternated between a presentation of 
team yellow and team blue. To make sure participants paid attention to all aspects of the 
stimuli, at the end of each block they were asked a yes/no-question about the previous trial. 
Within a maximum duration of 5 seconds, yes/no responses were made by pressing the ‘F’ 
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and ‘J’ button, respectively. These questions could be about the agent’s gender (was this 
person a man/woman?), or body (was this person facing forward?), as well as the person 
knowledge statements (did this person touch an object? did this person have a 
positive/negative attitude?). To ensure that participants remained alert to all elements of these 
stimuli, the content of questions could not be predicted. 
fMRI scanning: Shortly after the encoding phase (approximately 5 minutes), 
participants entered the scanner. Here, all the bodies were presented again. Participants were 
instructed to form an impression of these people based on what they previously learned about 
them. More details on fMRI scanning procedures are given below. 
Recognition phase: After completing scanning, participants performed a recognition 
task where all the bodies and statements were presented again. In each trial, two bodies 
appeared on the screen (both of the same gender, one of each team) together with a statement. 
One of the two bodies was previously paired with that statement. During this task, each body 
was presented twice, once as the correct and once as the incorrect answer. There were six 
different conditions: Positive (1), Negative (2), and Neutral (3) where team blue was the 
correct answer, and Positive (4), Negative (5), and Neutral (6) where team yellow was the 
correct answer. 
 
Behavioural data analysis 
A trial was considered an outlier if the reaction time was below 200 ms, ensuring that 
participants had taken enough time to read the statement and observe the bodies. This resulted 
in 0.10% rejected trials in the pilot experiment, and 0.67% rejected trials in the post-scanning 
recognition task. Participants’ performance (percent accurate) on the recognition task was first 
compared for all conditions against chance-level performance (50%). To do so, 95% 
confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated for each condition compared to 50% and Cohen’s 
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dz was calculated as a measure of effect size by dividing the mean difference by the standard 
deviation of the difference (Cohen, 1992; Lakens, 2013). 
In addition, a 2 (Valence: Positive, Negative) x 2 (Group: in-group, out-group) 
ANOVA compared performance between conditions. We expected an interaction between 
Valence and Group, whereby recognition was better when in-group members were associated 
with positive compared to negative social knowledge and vice versa for out-group members. 
A significant interaction would be followed-up with planned contrasts using 95% CIs, where 




Each participant’s scanning session started with a run of the body-localiser (see details 
below), followed by two runs of the main task. A further body-localiser run and two runs of 
the main task then followed. Interspersing the body-localiser between runs of the main task 
was done to vary the experience for participants and offset boredom. Participants then 
completed two runs of the ToM-localiser (see details below). The ToM-localiser was always 
presented after participants had completed the main task, to ensure that participants were not 
primed towards making trait inferences during the main task. Stimuli were presented using a 
desktop PC and Matlab software with Psychtoolbox (www.psychtoolbox.org). 
Main experimental task: The main task used a block-design to enhance statistical 
power (Friston et al., 1999) with blocks of bodies presented for 16 seconds. Each image (300 
x 650 pixels) was presented for 1800 ms, followed by a blank screen for 200 ms, resulting in 
a total of 8 bodies per block. The same bodies presented in the encoding task were now 
presented during scanning and grouped together in a block according to their assigned social 
knowledge (positive, negative, and neutral). For example, in a ‘positive’ block, all 8 bodies 
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were previously associated with positive social information. Participants were given the 
instruction to form an impression of each body, based on the information they learned about 
that body during the encoding phase. Participants were not required to remember the exact 
details of the social knowledge, but rather to recall the impression (good, bad, or neutral) they 
previously formed. At the end of each block, participants were asked a question about the 
previous body relating to their gender (was this person a woman/man?) or their team (was this 
person part of your/other team?). From trial-to-trial, the image location was slightly jittered (4 
different locations that varied by 10 pixels around a central fixation dot). From the four 
options, the location of the image on each trial was randomly selected. 
In one functional run, 20 blocks were completed and blocks were separated by a 
jittered rest block with an average duration of 7 seconds (which varied between 5 and 9 
seconds with 500 ms steps). The first 10 blocks in a run showed one team (Blue or Yellow) 
and the remaining blocks showed the other team. The order of team presentation was 
counterbalanced both within and across participants. For each participant, the first and last run 
had a fixed order (e.g., yellow followed by blue), and the second and third runs had the 
opposite order (e.g., blue followed by yellow). For half of the participants, the first run 
showed yellow then blue and the other half of participants showed blue followed by yellow. 
Therefore, each functional run was composed of two 10-block sequences. Each 10-block 
sequence showed bodies from a single team with each block showing bodies from one 
condition (Positive, Negative, or Neutral). In order to help effectively model the influence of 
different events on BOLD signal, block order within each 10-block sequence was 
counterbalanced so that within each sequence, each condition was preceded equally often by 
all conditions (Josephs and Henson, 1999; Wager and Nichols, 2003; Aguirre, 2007). To 
provide a completely balanced block “history” across conditions, each sequence began with a 
“starter block”, which was not included in the data analysis but modelled as a covariate of no 
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interest. Subsequently, three further blocks from each Social Knowledge condition were 
presented in a counterbalanced manner. Each participant completed 4 functional runs of this 
task, with 24 Positive (half blue, half yellow), 24 Negative and 24 Neutral blocks across the 
experiment for a total of 96 trials per condition. For all subsequent analyses, we focus on 
Positive and Negative conditions for In- and Out-group bodies. 
Functional localisers: To localise body-selective brain regions we used an established 
paradigm (Downing et al., 2007; http://pages.bangor.ac.uk/~pss811/page7/page7.html). We 
presented 12-sec blocks of cars and of whole bodies (without heads). A run started with a 
blank screen for 14 seconds, followed by two alternations of each condition. This was 
repeated a second time, and followed by a final rest period of 14 seconds. Each image was 
presented for 600 ms, followed by a blank screen for 100 ms. Twice during each block, the 
same image was presented two times in a row. Participants had to press a button whenever 
they detected this immediate repetition (1-back task). The image location was slightly jittered 
in the same way as in the main task. Each participant completed two runs of this task, 
counterbalancing the order of the stimulus presentation (Bodies or Cars). 
To localise brain regions that respond to mental state reasoning, we used an 
established ToM-localiser (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; http://saxelab.mit.edu/superloc.php). 
Participants read 10 short false belief stories, in which the belief characters have about the 
state of the world is false. Participants also read 10 false photograph stories, where a 
photograph, map, or sign has out-dated or misleading information. After reading each story, 
participants had to answer whether the subsequently presented statement is true or false. Each 
run started with a 12 second rest period, after which the stories and questions were presented 
for 14 seconds combined (stories: 10 seconds; questions: 4 seconds), and were separated by a 
12 second rest period. The order of items and conditions is identical for each subject. In the 
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first run, stimuli 1 – 5 from each condition were presented, and the remaining stimuli were 
presented during the second run. 
 
Data Acquisition 
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla scanner (Philips Achieva), equipped with a 32-
channel SENSE-head coil. Stimuli were displayed on a MR safe BOLD screen (Cambridge 
Research Systems: http://www.crsltd.com/) behind the scanner, which participants viewed via 
a mirror mounted on the head-coil. T2*-weighted functional images were acquired using a 
gradient echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence. An acquisition time of 2000 ms was used 
(image resolution: 3.03 x 3.03 x 4 mm3, TE = 30, flip angle = 90°). After the functional runs 
were completed, a high-resolution T1-weighted structural image was acquired for each 
participant (voxel size = 1 mm3, TE = 3.8 ms, flip angle = 8°, FoV = 288 × 232 × 175 mm3). 
Four dummy scans (4 * 2000 ms) were routinely acquired at the start of each functional run 
and were excluded from analysis. 
 
Data preprocessing and analysis 
Data were preprocessed and analysed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, London, UK: www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Functional images were realigned, 
unwarped, corrected for slice timing, and normalized to the MNI template with a resolution of 
3x3x3 mm and spatially smoothed using an 8 mm smoothing kernel. Head motion was 
examined for each functional run and a run was not analysed further if displacement across 
the scan exceeded 3 millimetres. 
Univariate model and analysis: Each condition was modelled from the onset of the 
first body for a duration of 16 seconds. A design matrix was fitted for each participant with 7 
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regressors in total; one for each condition (PosIn, PosOut, NegIn, NegOut, NeutralIn, 
NeutralOut), and one for the starter blocks. 
Main effects of Valence [Pos > Neg; Neg > Pos] and Group [In > Out; Out > In] were 
calculated first for completeness. The main analysis of interest, however, was the Valence by 
Group interaction [(PosIn > PosOut) > (NegIn > NegOut)] because it tests our primary 
hypothesis that brain systems will be tuned to information that is consistent with group biases 
(positive for in-group and negative for out-group). This univariate interaction analysis served 
two functions. As our primary research question could only be addressed by functional 
connectivity analyses, the first function of univariate analysis was to identify seed regions for 
subsequent connectivity-based analyses. The second function enabled the test of magnitude-
based hypotheses regarding the role of body perception, affective, and ToM networks during 
the perception of bodies as a function of group bias. That is, we will be able to test if body, 
affective and ToM networks are preferentially involved when visually processing bodies 
about which particular trait and group-based information is known. 
For the body and ToM localiser, a design matrix was fitted for each participant with 2 
regressors, two for each condition (bodies and cars; false beliefs and false photographs). 
Body-selective regions were revealed by contrasting bodies and cars (Bodies > Cars). The 
ToM-network was revealed by contrasting false beliefs with false photographs (False Beliefs 
> False Photographs). 
Psychophysiological Interaction analysis: Our primary hypothesis was that body-
selective areas, as well as parts of the affective and ToM networks would interact more when 
recalling trait information that fits the participant’s group bias (positive for in-group members 
and negative for out-group members). To test this hypothesis, we used psychophysiological 
interaction (PPI) analysis (Friston et al., 1997). PPI enables the identification of brain regions 
whose activity correlates with the activity of a seed region as a function of a task. Here we 
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used a generalized form of PPI, which allows for comparisons across the complete design 
space (McLaren et al., 2012). By doing so, it is possible to see whether any voxels across the 
brain show a correlation with activity in the seed region (the “physiological” element) as a 
function of the two conditions within the main task (the “psychological” element) (Figure 
3C). 
Two steps were taken to define seed regions for the PPI analysis (Figure 3A). First, 
based on the group-level univariate analysis, we identified any clusters of overlap between the 
interaction contrast and the functional localisers (i.e., body and/or ToM localiser) at the 
group-level. This group-level analysis can identify clusters showing body or ToM selectivity 
as well as sensitivity to the main task’s contrast. Second, if clusters of overlap were identified 
at the group-level, we identified subject-specific coordinates for regions of overlap at the 
single-subject level, thus allowing for inter-individual differences in peak responses. 
Separately for each individual participant we searched for overlap between the interaction 
contrast and the functional localisers (body and/or ToM localiser at the single-subject level). 
In order to include as many participant’s data as possible, we searched for overlap across a 
range of thresholds (p<.001 – 0.5), which is common when identifying seed regions in 
individual’s data (Spunt and Lieberman, 2012; Klapper et al., 2014; Paulus et al., 2015). For 
each seed region, therefore, we report how many participants show overlap between the main 
task’s contrast (across a range of thresholds; reported in Supplementary Table 2) and 
functional localisers at a fixed threshold (p<.001, voxel extent = 10). Volumes were generated 
using a 6 mm sphere, which was positioned on each individual’s seed-region peak. PPI 
analyses were run for all seed regions that were identified in this manner. 
PPI models for each participant included the 7 regressors from the univariate analyses 
as covariates of no interest, as well as 8 PPI regressors. PPI regressors included one for each 
condition (6 in total), one for the starter block, and one that modelled seed region activity 
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(Figure 3B). The starter block, seed region and neutral condition regressors are also modelled 
as covariates of no interest. Although we use clusters emerging from the univariate analysis to 
define seed regions for the PPI analysis, our PPI analysis is not circular (Kriegeskorte et al., 
2009), because all regressors from the univariate analysis are included within the PPI model 
as covariates of no interest (O’Reilly et al., 2012). The PPI analyses, therefore, explain 
variance in addition to that which is already explained by other regressors in the design and is 
statistically independent to the univariate analysis. 
To create the PPI regressors, the time series in the seed region was specified as the 
first eigenvariate, and was consequently deconvolved to estimate the underlying neural 
activity (Gitelman et al., 2003). Then, the deconvolved time series was multiplied by the 
predicted, pre-convolved time series of each of the seven regressors (6 conditions, and 1 
starter block). The resulting PPI for each condition in terms of predicted “neural” activity was 
then convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF) and the time 
series of the seed region as covariates of no interest (Klapper et al., 2014; McLaren et al., 
2012; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012). At the second-level analysis, we examined the same 
Valence by Group interaction contrast as in the univariate analyses [(PosIn > PosOut) > 
(NegIn > NegOut)]. 
For all group-level analyses (univariate and connectivity-based), images were 
thresholded using a voxel-level threshold of p<.001 and a voxel-extent of 10 voxels. Based on 
our hypotheses for functional connections between core and extended body perception 
networks, we inclusively mask the contrasts from the main task by body and ToM localisers 
(Bodies>Cars and False Beliefs>False Photographs thresholded at p<.001, k=10). In addition, 
an affective network mask was created by centring 15 mm spheres on coordinates taken from 
prior literature, which had identified brain regions associated with affective responses. The 
affective network mask included amygdala, insula, striatum and orbital frontal cortex (details 
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of all masks are reported in Table 1). Inclusive masking in this manner makes sure that only 
responses in brains regions associated with body perception, affective processing and ToM 
are interpreted. The results from these analyses are presented in Tables 2 and 3. P values 
following correction for multiple comparisons at the cluster level (Friston et al., 1994) are 




Behavioural data  
Pilot data. Performance on the recognition task revealed that, after an average 
retention time of 8.81 +/- 1.96 minutes, participants performed above chance on all conditions 
(PosIn: M=69.50%, CI.95 [64.27, 74.73], Cohen’s dz=1.37; PosOut: M=64.11%, CI.95 
[58.59, 69.63], Cohen’s dz=0.94; NegIn: M=62.10%, CI.95 [54.36, 69.84], Cohen’s dz=0.57; 
NegOut: M=66.47%, CI.95 [59.55, 73.38], Cohen’s dz=0.87). There was no main effect of 
Valence or Group (Valence: F(1,30)=1.07, p=.31, ηp2=.03; Group: F(1,30)=0.07, p=.79, 
ηp2=.002), nor a significant Valence*Group interaction (F(1,30)=1.86, p=.18, ηp2 =.06).	
The results of this pilot study demonstrate that after a short retention period (8-9 
minutes), performance on the recognition task was above chance-level for all four conditions 
and ranged between 62-69% accuracy (Figure 4). In the main experiment, fMRI scanning 
took place after a similar time period following the encoding phase (5-10 minutes). During 
scanning, therefore, we were confident that participants would be able to recall positive and 
negative information about both in-group and out-group members at a rate between 62% and 
69%. Although recognition performance shows a trend to be tuned in a manner consistent 
with group bias (i.e., higher for positive in-group information and negative out-group 
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information; Figure 4), there was no significant interaction between valence and group. Thus, 
our pilot data showed relatively weak sensitivity to group-valence pairings. 
Post-scanning data. First, we tested if recognition performance was greater than 
chance for each condition. Performance was above chance (50%) for PosIn (M=55.69%, 
CI.95 [50.55, 60.83], Cohen’s dz=0.48) and NegOut (M=55.34%, CI.95 [51.23, 59.44], 
Cohen’s dz=0.56). However, performance was not different from chance-level for PosOut 
(M=49.26%, CI.95 [44.08, 54.43], Cohen’s dz=0.06) and NegIn (M=48.64%, CI.95 [43.98, 
53.29], Cohen’s dz=0.13). 
Second, we tested how performance on the recognition task varied as a function of 
Valence and Group using a 2x2 ANOVA. There was no main effect of either Valence 
(Positive or Negative; F(1,22)=0.07, p=.79, ηp2=.003) or Group (In or Out; F(1,22)=0.002, 
p=.97, ηp2<.001). There was a significant Valence by Group interaction (F(1,22)=7.71, p=.01, 
ηp2 =.26), which showed better recognition of Positive compared to Negative in-group 
members, and vice versa for out-group members (Figure 4). Follow-up analyses interrogated 
the interaction by comparing recognition of positive and negative information for in- and out-
group members separately. This revealed a difference for the in-group between positive and 
negative (Mean difference=7.05%, CI.95 [2.22, 11.89], Cohen’s dz=0.63). There was a 
weaker difference for out-group (Mean difference=6.08%, CI.95 [-1.27, 13.43], Cohen’s 
dz=0.36). Therefore, the direction of the difference was consistent with predictions for both 
the in-group, as well as the out-group, but the effect was stronger for the in-group than the 
out-group. 
Compared to the pilot data, which were collected 8-9 minutes after encoding, the post-
scanning data were collected 90 minutes after encoding. As such, we suggest that reduced 
recall performance during the post-scanning recognition phase most likely reflects 
deterioration of recall performance over time (Figure 4). In addition, there was a Valence by 
 20 
Group interaction in the post-scanning data but not the pilot data. Even though the interaction 
term was only significant in the post-scanning data, the pattern of results was consistent 
throughout both datasets: recall was higher for positive than negative in-group information as 
well as higher for negative than positive out-group information. We quantitatively confirmed 
this pattern of results using meta-analysis (Supplementary Results). 
The pattern of results is not consistent with a response bias or general tendency to 
associate in-group members with positive and out-group members with negative information. 
If results were consistent with a response bias, we would expect the inconsistent conditions to 
be below chance performance. That is, we would expect in-group targets to be incorrectly 
associated with good traits (when they previously associated with negative traits) and out-
group targets to be incorrectly identified with negative traits (when they were previously 
associated with positive traits). We do not find this pattern of recognition data in either of our 




Functional localiser data: Group average MNI coordinates across participants are 
reported in square brackets. For the Bodies > Cars contrast based on the body-localiser data, 
clusters were revealed in right EBA for all 24 participants [54,-70,4], and in right FBA for 19 
participants [51,-40,-23]. For the False Beliefs > False Photographs contrast based on the 
ToM-localiser data, clusters were revealed in right TPJ [60,-58,25] for 23 participants, and in 
left TPJ [-45,-64,28], bilateral temporal poles [(-)51,5,-32], Precuneus [-9,-49,34], and mPFC 
[6,56,28] for 22 participants. 
Univariate analyses 
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Main effects: No suprathreshold clusters were revealed within either the body, ToM, 
or affective networks for the main effect of Valence or Group (Pos vs. Neg; In vs. Out). 
Interaction: The Valence by Group interaction [(PosIn>PosOut) > (NegIn>NegOut)] 
revealed one cluster in the Affective network mask, which was located in left insula/putamen 
(Table 2C; Figure 5). The parameter estimates revealed stronger involvement of this cluster 
during the perception of positive compared to negative in-group members, and vice versa for 
out-group members. No suprathreshold clusters emerged when masked by the body or ToM 
localiser. To explore the null result in body and ToM networks further, we lowered the 
threshold to p<.005, k=0 and clusters emerged in right fusiform gyrus, which overlapped with 
the body-localiser (FBA), and bilateral temporal poles and left TPJ, which overlapped with 
the ToM-localiser (Supplementary Table 1). At this lower threshold, we do not interpret 
univariate responses in body or ToM networks, due to the increased likelihood of such 
clusters being false-positives (Eklund et al., 2016). Instead, we use them to guide the location 
of seed region specification in subsequent PPI analyses. The selection of seed regions in this 
manner does not influence the integrity of subsequent functional connectivity analyses 
because the two types of analysis are statistically independent to each other. As a 
consequence, if seed regions selected in this manner are not part of a network that integrates 
information as a function of social information and group bias, then we should expect no 
functional coupling between body, ToM, and affective nodes in subsequent functional 
connectivity analyses. 
Psychophysiological Interaction analyses: Coordinates of overlap within individual 
participants were identified in right FBA (n=16), temporal poles (left: n=23; right: n=18), left 
TPJ (n=19) and left insula/putamen (n=19). We hypothesized that body-selective areas, as 
well as parts of the affective and ToM networks, would interact more when recalling trait 
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information that fits the participant’s group bias (positive in-group members and negative out-
group members). 
For the body-selective and affective network seed regions, no suprathreshold clusters 
emerged (Table 3.1, 3.3). For ToM seed regions, left TPJ was functionally coupled with right 
FBA in a manner consistent with our prediction. PPI estimates revealed functional coupling 
that was stronger for positive compared to negative in-group members and vice versa for out-
group members (Figure 6, Table 3.2). 
At the primary threshold, functional coupling is restricted to one connection between 
FBA and TPJ. In order to aid future meta-analyses and avoid under-reporting of null-results 
(Lieberman and Cunningham, 2009), in supplementary material we have included an 
exploratory set of PPI analyses at a lower statistical threshold (p<.005, k=10). At this lower 
threshold, functional coupling is more widespread and involves interactions between 
perceptual, affective, and ToM networks (Supplementary Tables 3, 4, 5 & Supplementary 
Figure 2). We do not place any firm interpretations on these results due to the increased 
likelihood of reporting false-positives (Eklund et al., 2016). Instead, by reporting these 
findings in supplementary materials, the data will be useful to others who wish to perform 
meta-analyses or pursue replicating and extending these results. Furthermore, we avoid the 
file-drawer problem and provide a less biased estimate of effect sizes, thus providing a 
platform for a more cumulative science (Rosenthal, 1979). 
 
Discussion 
Judgments about other people are often biased by favouritism towards in-group members 
compared to out-group members (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999; Stangor, 2014). Previous 
neuroscience research has revealed that group biases are underpinned by differential 
engagement of perceptual, affective, and cognitive neural networks (Molenberghs, 2013; 
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Amodio, 2014). However, the contribution of neural integration between these networks 
during group bias modulation has received little attention. In the current study, we report 
functional connectivity between perceptual and cognitive neural networks that is dependent 
on the combination of valence information and group membership. Specifically, connections 
between these social brain circuits are tuned to information that is consistent with group 
biases (i.e., positive for in-group and negative for out-group). In sum, this study demonstrates 
how functional integration between neural networks is associated with the detection and 
categorisation of others into “us” and “them”. 
 
Neural network integration during group bias modulation of person perception 
The main outcome from this study is clear evidence that the body and ToM networks interact 
during group bias modulation of person perception. Brain regions associated with visual 
analysis of others (Kanwisher, 2010) and mental state reasoning (Frith and Frith, 1999; Saxe 
and Kanwisher, 2003; van Overwalle, 2009) exchange signals when detecting and evaluating 
in-group and out-group members. Moreover, the exchange of signals has a specific 
relationship. Functional links between these circuits are greater for bias consistent (positive 
for in-group and negative for out-group) compared to bias inconsistent pairings. Thus, 
functional coupling is not squarely centred on group status (in or out-group) or valence of 
social knowledge (positive or negative); instead, these networks are tuned to particular 
combinations of social information (in-group, good; out-group, bad). The results therefore 
provide neural integration evidence for an information processing account that favours bias-
consistent pairings (Fyock and Stangor, 1994). 
Functional coupling in the current study was specifically tied to particular nodes 
within each network: Right FBA was coupled to TPJ. Right FBA forms part of a circuit that 
performs a visual analysis of physical features and is more sensitive to a holistic or whole-
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person body representation (Peelen and Downing, 2007; Downing and Peelen, 2011). The 
current results show that a signal from right FBA biases processing and/or is modulated by 
processing in the ToM-network. Prior functional connectivity research has shown that 
forming links between physical features and trait knowledge is associated with coupling 
between right FBA and the ToM-network (Greven et al., 2016), whereas recall of trait 
knowledge during body perception is associated with coupling between right EBA and the 
ToM network (Greven & Ramsey, 2017). We extend this line of research and add to 
understanding of the connectivity profile of right FBA. We show that right FBA’s functional 
connections are not restricted to forming impressions during first encounters (Greven et al., 
2016), but also operate when person perception cues the recall and assimilation of trait 
knowledge and group status. These findings suggest a broader role for right FBA in social 
perception, one that not only processes body shape and posture but also exchanges 
information with other circuits to inform a more global level of identity representation. 
The current results provide support for the view that dynamic interplay exists between 
perceptual and extended systems (Patterson et al., 2007; Collins and Olson, 2014a), and that 
such interplay indexes a global representation of identity, which is not restricted to physical 
features, but incorporates a broader landscape of person factors, such as group status and trait 
knowledge (Ramsey et al., 2011). Moreover, the results in right FBA support the view that 
category-selective responses in ventral temporal cortex cannot be reduced to visual processing 
of object features alone, but instead reflect wider knowledge that is tied to the observed object 
(Bi et al., 2016; Peelen and Downing, 2017). 
 
Toward a network model of group bias  
Several distinct mental operations have been shown to underpin the detection and 
categorisation of others into in-groups and out-groups, which span perceptual, affective and 
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cognitive processing components (Molenberghs, 2013; Amodio, 2014). We extend these 
models of group bias by placing them within a network model framework, which considers 
integration across processing components, as well as local processing within components 
(Sporns, 2013). As such, we have started to place greater emphasis on the contribution of 
neural integration to group bias and person perception research (Supplementary Figure 2). 
From a network model perspective, many questions remain unanswered (Bassett and 
Gazzaniga, 2011; Wig et al., 2011). Network models have particular structures, which include 
‘hubs’ that act as a conduit for information flow between distinct processing components. 
Future work in social perception may consider investigating whether particular nodes within 
social circuits act as hubs. Good candidates may be right FBA and temporal poles, due to 
their anatomical connectivity to each other (Collins and Olson, 2014b) and functional 
properties (Downing and Peelen, 2011; Olson et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2017), but future work 
would have to investigate this directly. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
In the current study, our results did not survive correction for multiple comparisons and 
therefore could reflect a Type-1 error or false positive (Eklund et al., 2016). It should be 
noted, however, that we used functional and anatomical masks to constrain our search space 
only to three brain networks that were identified based upon prior research investigating the 
neuroscience of group bias (Molenberghs 2013; Amodio 2014). Therefore, there was a strong 
a priori justification to expect interactions between these specific brain networks and based 
on our data our best estimate is that the targeted effects may be relatively small in magnitude. 
Following recent suggestions in the neuroimaging literature (Lieberman and Cunningham, 
2009), as well as more generally in psychological science (Cumming, 2014), accurate 
estimation of population effect sizes will only be possible if all results are reported 
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transparently even if they are null or mixed results (Simmons et al., 2011; Cumming, 2014). 
Thus, we offer caution in interpreting our results as they could reflect a false positive, whilst 
encouraging future studies to test the general hypothesis further as well as consider meta-
analytical approaches. 
The measure of connectivity used in the current study is correlational and based on 
functional activity. Therefore, the current study provides no insight into the direction of 
influence or underlying neural pathway that controls functional coupling between brain areas. 
Future work using directional connectivity measures (Friston, 2009), structural connectivity 
(Le Bihan, 2012) and studies that combine fMRI with neurostimulation techniques (Driver et 
al., 2010; Bestmann and Feredoes, 2013) would provide grounds for more causal inferences 
to be made regarding network interactions. 
A further consideration is that post-scanning recognition performance (approximately 
90 min after encoding) is at chance-level for two conditions (inconsistent pairings), but 
remains above-chance for two conditions (consistent pairings; Figure 4). As such, it is 
possible that our neural results reflect a more general effect associated with recall of 
information compared to chance-level recall, rather than any relationship between group bias 
and social knowledge pairings. However, our pilot data makes this possibility unlikely. 
Participants were scanned approximately 5-10 minutes after the encoding phase and the main 
task was being performed for approximately 1 hour in the scanner. We know from our pilot 
data that at the start of scanning recognition accuracy was between 62-70%. As such, 
although recall performance decreased over 90 minutes, based on our pilot data we expect 
that for the majority of scanning, participants’ recall was better than chance for all conditions. 
Consequently, we expect our results to reflect the influence of group bias, even if they 
underestimate the true size of the effects. Future studies that use a stronger group bias 
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Table 1. Details of the body, ToM, and affective masks. Average coordinates given for each 
region of the body-localiser (bilateral extrastriate and fusiform body area; EBA and 
FBA) and ToM-localiser (bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), temporal poles (TP), 
Precuneus, and medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC)). For the affective mask, coordinates of 
each area (amygdala, anterior and posterior insula, striatum, and five clusters within the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)) and their source from the literature are provided. 
Network Area Hemisphere Coordinate Source 
Body 
EBA - 54,-70,4 Functional localiser (Downing 










mPFC - 6,56,28 









(Kurth et al., 2010; Cerliani et 
al., 2012; Jakab et al., 2012; 







Left -16,4,-4 (Tanaka et al., 2004; Seymour 


























Table 2. Univariate results for the Valence by Group [(PosIn > PosOut) > (NegIn > NegOut)] 
contrast a) masked by the body-localiser, b) masked by the ToM-localiser, and c) masked by 










x y z 
 a) Masked by body-localiser (EBA and FBA) 
 No suprathreshold clusters 
 b) Masked by ToM-localiser  
 No suprathreshold clusters 
 c) Masked by Affective Network  
Left insula 17 3.96 0.20 -30 -16 -2  
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Table 3. PPI results based on body-selective, theory of mind, and affective network seed 
regions. Clusters revealed in the PsychoPhysiological Interaction (PPI) analysis for the 
Valence by Group [(PosIn > PosOut) > (NegIn > NegOut)] contrast using the 1) body 
selective 2) Theory of mind and 3) Affective network seed regions. Seed regions were defined 
by the univariate Valence by Group contrast and masked by the Body localiser, ToM-localiser 










x y z 
1 ) Body-selective seed regions: right FBA 
 a) Masked by ToM-localiser  
 No suprathreshold clusters 
 b) Masked by Affective Network 
 No suprathreshold clusters 
1 2) Theory of mind seed regions 
 a) Masked by body-localiser (EBA and FBA) 
 Seed regions: bilateral TPs 
 No suprathreshold clusters 
 Seed regions: left TPJ 
Right fusiform gyrus (FBA) 10 4.31 .25 48 -43 -14  
 b) Masked by Affective Network 
 Seed regions: bilateral TPs and left TPJ 
 No suprathreshold clusters 
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 3) Affective network seed regions: left insula 
 a) Masked by body-localiser (EBA and FBA) 
 No suprathreshold clusters 
 b) Masked by ToM-localiser  
 No suprathreshold clusters 
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Supplementary Table 1. Univariate results for the Valence by Group [(PosIn > PosOut) > 
(NegIn > NegOut)] contrast a) masked by the body-localiser, b) masked by the ToM-localiser. 
Region Number 
of voxels 




x y z 
A) Masked by body-localiser (EBA and FBA) 
Thresholded at p<.005, k=0 
Right fusiform gyrus 5 3.19 .97 45 -37 -14 
B) Masked by ToM-localiser 
Thresholded at p<.005, k=0 
Left temporal pole 7 3.69 .83 -42 8 -41 
Left temporal pole 2 3.42 .91 -42 23 -20 
Right temporal pole 2 3.42 .91 30 17 -29 
Left temporal pole 3 2.90 .90 -30 14 -29 
Right temporal pole 5 2.99 .86 36 14 -38 
Left middle temporal gyrus / 
temporoparietal junction 
1 2.97 .93 -63 -55 16 
Right temporal pole 2 2.90 .91 39 17 -23 
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Supplementary Table 2. Details of individual subjects’ overlap between social Valence by 
Group [(PosIn > PosOut) > (NegIn > NegOut)] contrast and the body and ToM localisers as 
well as the affective network mask. 
Seed-region Main task threshold at which overlap was found in individual subjects 
p<.001 p<.005 p<.01 p<.05 p<.1 p<.2 p<.3 p<.4 p<.5 
Right FBA (n=16) 1 2 0 2 3 4 3 1 0 
Left TPJ (n=19) 2 3 2 2 2 4 2 1 1 
Left TP (n=23) 0 0 0 5 6 5 5 1 1 
Right TP (n=18) 0 1 0 4 5 4 3 1 0 




Supplementary Table 3. PPI results based on body-selective seed regions. Clusters revealed 
in the PsychoPhysiological Interaction (PPI) analysis for the Valence by Group [(PosIn > 
PosOut) > (NegIn > NegOut)] contrast using the body selective seed region defined by the 
univariate Valence by Group contrast (right FBA), a) masked by the ToM-localiser, and b) 
masked by the affective network. 
Region Number of 
voxels 





x y z  
a) Seed region: right FBA masked by ToM-localiser  
Right TPJ 13 4.23 .74 63 -46 37 
b) Seed region: right FBA masked by affective network 
Left anterior insula 20 4.17 .65 -36 23 4 
Left striatum/superior orbital gyrus 18 4.08 .68 -18 17 -14 
Left hippocampus extending into 
amygdala 
25 4.07 .57 -15 5 -26 
Right middle orbital gyrus 22 3.66 .62 30 38 -14 
3.49 33 29 -17 
Right amygdala 10 3.16 .81 15 11 -23 
3.06 18 2 -17 
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Supplementary Table 4. PPI results based on theory-of-mind seed regions. Clusters revealed 
in the PsychoPhysiological Interaction (PPI) analysis for the Valence by Group [(PosIn > 
PosOut) > (NegIn > NegOut)] contrast using ToM seed regions defined by the univariate 
Valence by Group contrast (bilateral temporal poles (TP) and left TPJ), a) masked by the 
body-localiser, and b) masked by the affective network. 
Region Number of 
voxels 




x y z 
a) Masked by body-localiser (EBA and FBA) 
Seed regions: bilateral TP 
No suprathreshold clusters 
Seed region: left TPJ 
Right fusiform gyrus (FBA) 70 4.31 .33 48 -43 -14 
b) Masked by affective network 
Seed region: right TP 
Right amygdala 10 3.92 .77 18 5 -14 
Left amygdala extending into 
hippocampus 
12 3.33 .74 -24 -4 -14 
3.14 -15 -7 -14 
Seed region: left TP 
Left insula 31 3.50 .52 -33 8 4 
Seed region: left TPJ 
No suprathreshold clusters 
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Supplementary Table 5. PPI results based on affective seed regions. Clusters revealed in the 
PsychoPhysiological Interaction (PPI) analysis for the Valence by Group [(PosIn > PosOut) > 
(NegIn > NegOut)] contrast using affective seed regions defined by the univariate Valence by 
Group contrast (left insula), a) masked by the body-localiser, and b) masked by the ToM-
localiser. 
Region Number of 
voxels 





x y z  
Affective network seed region: left insula 
a) Masked by body-localiser (EBA and FBA) 
No suprathreshold clusters 
b) Masked by ToM-localiser  
Left anterior superior temporal sulcus 10 3.96 .78 -57 -16 -5 
Left anterior superior temporal sulcus 13 3.55 .74 -66 -34 1 
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Figure 1. Neural networks involved in body perception (green), Theory of Mind (blue), and 
affective processing (yellow). Abbreviations: Extrastriate Body Area (EBA), Fusiform Body 
Area (FBA), TemporoParietal Junction (TPJ), Temporal Pole (TP), Precuneus (PreC), medial 









Figure 3. Flow chart illustrating the steps to define seed regions and run PsychoPhysiological 
Interactions (PPI) analyses. A) Identification of seed regions in the univariate analysis was 
done at group and single-subject level to allow for inter-individual differences in peak 
responses. B) An illustration of the design matrix (this was the same for each run), that was 
created for each participant. C) The “psychological” (task) and “physiological” (time course 





Figure 4. Behavioural results for the pilot and post-scanning recognition task. **: p<.01. 
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. The data in the pilot experiment were collected 
after a 8-9 minute delay, while the post-fMRI data was collected 90 minutes after finishing 




Figure 5. Results from the univariate analysis. The Valence by Group [(PosIn > PosOut) > 
(NegIn > NegOut)] contrast revealed one cluster within the affective network in left posterior 




Figure 6. Results from the PsychoPhysiological Interaction (PPI) analysis. Seed regions were 
identified based on clusters emerging from the Valence by Group [(PosIn>PosOut) > (NegIn 
> NegOut)] contrast at the univariate level (see Supplementary Tables 1 and 2). Each 
identified region from the univariate analysis was used as a seed region with the Valence by 
Group term as the contrast of interest. Clusters emerging from these analyses reveal the 
strength of correlation over time between activity in that cluster and that in the seed region as 
a function of the task. PPI analyses revealed that seed region left TPJ (solid orange circle) 
showed functional coupling with a body-selective patch. A cluster in right FBA showed 
greater functional coupling with left TPJ when recalling positive and negative traits about in- 
and out-group members, respectively (shown in red). These areas overlapped with the body-
localiser (shown in green; overlap is shown in yellow). The PPI estimates are extracted from a 




Supplementary Figure 1. Results from a meta-analysis of the pilot and post-scanning 
behavioural data. Bars represent point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of 
interest from each study in the meta-analysis, as well as the combined random effects model. 
A) The interaction effect (difference in recall for positive compared to negative trait 
information for in-group compared to out-group members) shows that the difference in recall 
accuracy between positive and negative trait information for in-group members is greater than 
for out-group members. This interaction effect is formed by recall accuracy being greater 
when recalling positive compared to negative information about B) in-group members and 
vice versa for C) out-group members. A comparison of B) and C) reveals that the out-group 
bias for negative trait knowledge is smaller and less consistent than the in-group bias for 
positive trait knowledge. 
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Supplementary Figure 2. Summary of the functional connectivity between neural networks 
involved in body perception (green), Theory of Mind (ToM; blue), and affective processing 
(yellow) when observing group-members that cued the recall of social knowledge that fit the 
stereotype (positive in-group and negative out-group members) compared to when it didn’t fit 
the stereotype (negative in-group and positive out-group members). 1) Functional integration 
of body and ToM networks: right Fusiform Body Area (FBA) is functionally coupled with 
bilateral TemporoParietal Junction (TPJ). 2) Nodes in the ToM-network couple with the 
affective network: left temporal pole (TP) couples with left anterior insula, while right 
temporal pole connects with bilateral amygdala (AMG). Additionally, left posterior insula 
couples with left anterior Superior Temporal Sulcus (aSTS). 3) Node in the body network 
couples with the affective network: right FBA couples with bilateral amygdala, left striatum, 





Behavioural pilot experiment 
A pilot experiment was completed that had a similar structure to the main experiment. This 
experiment was conducted to determine whether participants could reliably recognise the 




Thirty-one participants (24 females; mean ± SD age: 20.8 ± 6 years) were recruited from the 
Bangor community and received course credits for completing the pilot experiment. They 
gave informed consent according to the local ethics guidelines. 
 
Design 
The design was the same as the main experiment, except for the changes below. Participants 
were evenly divided into two teams (blue and yellow), given a t-shirt of their team’s colour to 
wear, and the two teams completed the experiments in separate rooms. In these experiments, 
participants observed 128 bodies (64 female of which half were team Blue and half were team 
Yellow). 
 
Retention period: Following the encoding phase, participants in the pilot experiment would 
take a short break (~10 min) during which they filled in a questionnaire. This was done to 
ensure that recency effects (performance on recognition is better for bodies that were 
presented last during encoding phase; Gershberg and Shimamura, 1994) did not influence the 
performance on the subsequent recognition test. 
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Recognition task: On each trial, participants were presented with two bodies (one Blue and 
one Yellow) and asked to select the body they thought had previously been paired with the 
simultaneously presented statement. Both of these bodies had previously been presented with 





Meta-analysis of behavioural data 
To provide quantitative support for the pattern of results across both behavioural 
datasets, we performed a meta-analysis of the pilot and post-scanning data using Exploratory 
Software for Confidence Intervals (ESCI; Cumming 2012). ESCI weights the contribution of 
each study as a function of sample size and variability of the estimate to provide a global 
estimate. Therefore, studies with larger samples and smaller variability have a higher 
weighting than studies with smaller samples and larger variability. 
We meta-analysed three effects of interest (Supplementary Figure 1). The first effect 
was the interaction term, which was calculated as the difference in recall for positive 
compared to negative trait information for in-group compared to out-group members. Two 
further effects comprised the difference in recall performance between positive and negative 
information for (2) in-group and (3) out-group members separately. We used a random effects 
model to estimate the size of the effect as recommended by Cumming (2012). Effects are 
estimated in original units (% accuracy) using 95% confidence intervals. The meta-analysed 
interaction effect shows that the difference in recall accuracy between positive and negative 
trait information for in-group members is greater than for out-group members (Supplementary 
Figure 1A). This interaction effect is formed by recall accuracy being greater when recalling 
positive compared to negative information about in-group members (Supplementary Figure 
1B) and vice versa for out-group members (Supplementary Figure 1C). By comparing 
Supplementary Figures 1B and 1C, it is clear that the out-group bias for negative trait 
knowledge is smaller and less consistent than the in-group bias for positive trait knowledge. 
 
 
